If we are skeptical about the truth of religious or moral belief, what should we do about those ways of talking and thinking? According to the fictionalist, they provide pragmatic benefits that do not depend on their truth. This volume examines religious fictionalism, moral fictionalism, and the relation between these views.
If we are skeptical about the truth of religious or moral belief, what should we do about those ways of talking and thinking? According to the fictionalist, they provide pragmatic benefits that do not depend on their truth. This volume examines religious fictionalism, moral fictionalism, and the relation between these views.
Atheism is a familiar kind of skepticism about religion. Moral error theory is an analogous kind of skepticism about morality, though less well known outside academic circles. Both kinds of skeptic face a
Richard Joyce received his PhD from Princeton in 1998. Over the following years he held academic positions at the University of Sheffield, the Australian National University, and the University of Sydney, eventually taking up a professorship at Victoria University of Wellington in 2010. He is the author of Essays in Moral Skepticism (OUP, 2016), The Evolution of Morality (MIT Press, 2006), and The Myth of Morality (CUP, 2001). Inaddition, he has edited several collections and has published numerous journal articles and book chapters, largely in the areas of metaethics and moral psychology.Stuart Brock is a Professor of Philosophy at Victoria University of Wellington. He received his PhD from Princeton in 2002, and subsequently taught at Western Washington University. He has published numerous journal articles and book chapters on fiction and fictionalism. He is co-author of A Critical Introduction to Fictionalism (Bloomsbury, 2018) and Realism and Antirealism (Routledge, 2007) and co-editor of Fictional Objects (OUP, 2015).
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