Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence

Part of a three part collection in honour of the teachings of Michael I. Handel, one of the foremost strategists of the late 20th century, this collection explores the paradoxes of intelligence analysis, surprise and deception from both historical and theoretical perspectives. Written by a distinguished group of scholars and practitioners of intelligence from the United States, Canada and Israel, the volume's essays reflect the topics that Handel explored throughout his professional career. Richard K. Betts explores the politicization of intelligence, a theme that Handel examined in his essay "The Politics of Intelligence," which is also reprinted in the volume. Woodrow J. Kuhns examines the contribution of epistemology to intelligence analysis. James J. Wirtz uses Handel's theoretical work on intelligence failure as the starting point to derive a theory of surprise. John Ferris explores perhaps the premier case of deception in wartime: Britain's development of deception operations during World War II. Uri Bar-Joseph examines why Israel was surprised by the outbreak of the 1973 October War. Mark M.Lowenthal's essay looks at how changes in technology might influence surprise and deception in the future.

'Admirers of the late Michael Handel will welcome this short volume of essays' - Foreign Affairs

Betts, Richard K.; Mahnken, Thomas

Part of a three part collection in honour of the teachings of Michael I. Handel, one of the foremost strategists of the late 20th century, this collection explores the paradoxes of intelligence analysis, surprise and deception from both historical and theoretical perspectives. Written by a distinguished group of scholars and practitioners of intelligence from the United States, Canada and Israel, the volume's essays reflect the topics that Handel explored throughout his professional career. Richard K. Betts explores the politicization of intelligence, a theme that Handel examined in his essay "The Politics of Intelligence," which is also reprinted in the volume. Woodrow J. Kuhns examines the contribution of epistemology to intelligence analysis. James J. Wirtz uses Handel's theoretical work on intelligence failure as the starting point to derive a theory of surprise. John Ferris explores perhaps the premier case of deception in wartime: Britain's development of deception operations during World War II. Uri Bar-Joseph examines why Israel was surprised by the outbreak of the 1973 October War. Mark M. Lowenthal's essay looks at how changes in technology might influence surprise and deception in the future.

Before the two world wars, Churchill was deeply concerned by the threats that faced Great Britain in the international arena. This volume examines Churchill's views about the rise of German and Japanese power, and how the growing armed strength of these two countries undermined the security of Britain and its empire. In addition, new technologies were transforming the international and strategic environment, not always to Britain's advantage. The growing importance of air power in modern warfare, for example, posed the grave danger of direct attacks by bombers on the British home isles. The authors also offer new appraisals of the foreign policy and strategic prescriptions advocated by Churchill.

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